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MR. JUSTICE BRANDEIS, COMPETITION AND SMALLNESS:
A DILEMMA RE-EXAMINED
The late Mr. Justice Louis D. Brandeis was born in Louisville,
Kentucky on Nov. 13, 1856. The Yale Law Journal commemorates
the hundredth anniversary of his birth with the following analysis of
his economic thought.
THE attitude that government should take toward the large business firm
was a question to which Louis Brandeis devoted a lifetime of thought. Dis-
trustful of all concentration of power, he maintained that the giant corpora-
tion was a menace to the democratic process." Brandeis believed that the
social development of the individual, neglected in a concentrated economy,
would be fostered by an atmosphere of small business. He thus concluded
society would profit if the government shattered the big enterprises which
dominated industry.
The timeliness of the "bigness" problem which Brandeis strove to solve
is shown by the complexities confronting antitrust policy today. The business
unit which Brandeis condemned has become the nucleus of the modern
American economy ;2 an era of industrial concentration has brought with it
conflicting theories of business regulation. Many writers, impressed by the
productive potential of contemporary big business, have urged that the economic
performance of a firm or industry should determine the legality of a given
market structure. 3 Efficiency, progress and the profit pattern should thus be
the controlling norms, rather than the degree of market power.4 Domina-
tion of an industry by a single giant firm or a handful of oligopolists ought
not by itself be held violative of the antitrust laws; the government should be
1. United States Steel was, to Brandeis, an example of the dangers inherent in large
corporations:
"[W]e cannot maintain democratic conditions in America if we allow organizations to
arise in our midst with the power of the [United States] Steel Corporation. Liberty of
the American citizen cannot endure against such organizations." Statement of Brandeis,
Hearings Before the House Committee on Investigation of United States Steel Corpora-
tion, 62d Cong., 2d Sess. 2862 (1912) (hereinafter cited as Steel Hearings) ; see also
id. at 2835-72.
2. See BERLE, THE 20r CENTURY CAPITALIST REVOLUTION 25-27 (1954); KAPIAN,
BIG ENTERPRISE IN A COMPETITIVE SYSTEM cC. III, IV, VI (1954); Adelman, The
Measurement of Industrial Concentration, 33 REv. EcoN. STAT. 269 (1951).
In 1947, 139 of the country's 105,390 manufacturing corporations owned 45% of the
assets of all manufacturing corporations. Adelman, supra at 277, 289.
3. See, e.g., GRIFFIN, AN EcoNomIC APPROACH To ANTITRUST PROBLEMS (1951);
LILIENTHAL, BIG BUSINESS: A NEW ERA c. 21 (1952); UNITED STATES DEP'T OF CoM-
mERLE, EFFECTIVE COiPETITION: A REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF COAMiERCE BY His
BUSINESS ADVISORY COUNCIL (1952).
4. See GRIFFIN, op. cit. supra note 3, at 63-85; E. S. Mason, The Current Status of
the Monopoly Problem in the United States, 62 HARV. L. REv. 1265, 1281-82 (1949).
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required to show that the monopoly power inherent in large market shares
has been exercised to the detriment of the consumer. 5
Alternative standards for enforcement of the antitrust laws have been
presented by the adherents of the "structural" approach. Wary of the possi-
bility of abuse incident to monopoly power,6 they stress the number of inde-
pendent sources of supply open to the consumer, as well as the relative market
share held by each competitor.7 Diffusion of market power through a multi-
plicity of firms would, they claim, place automatic checks on the broad dis-
cretion enjoyed by business leaders in a concentrated economy.3
Under the antitrust policy encompassed in the criteria of the "performance"
school, a large business unit maintaining its present position of market domi-
nance by superior efficiency and progressiveness would not be vulnerable to
prosecution. Preservation of market power by economic performance alone
would be considered a fair method of competition, in contrast to employment
of coercive tactics to suppress potential competitors. 9 Supporters of the struc-
tural approach to antitrust policy would generally favor dissolution of the
industrial giant, regardless of the adequacy of its current performance. Some
writers emphasize that the huge corporate enterprise can often be replaced
by a limited number of smaller firms without sacrificing efficiency and pro-
gress.10 Other members of the structural school are less concerned with eco-
nomic results than with the social advantages of decentralized industrial power;
5. "The law . . . does not make the mere size of a corporation, however impressive,
or the existence of unexerted power on its part, an offense, when unaccompanied by un-
lawful conduct in the exercise of its power." United States v. International Harvester
Co., 274 U.S. 693, 708 (1927) (opinion by Sanford, J.); see also United States v.
United States Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417, 451 (1920).
Although Mr. Justice Brandeis was a member of the Supreme Court when United
States Steel was decided, he disqualified himself from consideration of the case on
the basis of his testimony before the congressional committee investigating that corpora-
tion. He subsequently disqualified himself from consideration of International Harvester.
Thus, without the opportunity to express his views in dissent, he listened in silence as
the Court issued decisions directly contradictory of his economic philosophy. See Hamil-
ton, The Jurist's Art, 31 CoLum. L. REv. 1073, 1086 n.66 (1931).
6. "[T]he material consideration in determining whether a monopoly exists is not
that prices are raised and that competition actually is excluded but that power exists to
raise prices or to exclude competition when it is desired to do so." American Tobacco
Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 811 (1946) (opinion by Burton, J.).
7. See, e.g., EDWARDS, MAINTAINING Co TIzrTrION 9-10 (1949); Bowman, Toward
Less Monopoly, 101 U. PA. L. Rav. 577, 631-41 (1953); Stigler, The Extent and Bases
of Monopoly, 32 Am. EcON. REV. 1, 2-3 (Supp., June 1942).
8. For a comparison of the market performance and market structure tests of
monopoly, see DiRLAm & KAHN, FAIR 'COMPETITION: THE LAW AND Econo Iics OF
ANTITRUST POLIcy 29-42 (1954); E. S. Mason, supra note 4.
9. Even the foremost defenders of big business concede that certain unfair business
practices should be "per se" violations of the antitrust laws, regardless of the end results.
See GRIFFIN, op. cit. sitpra note 3, at 52.
10. See, e.g., ADAmS & GRAY, MONOPOLY IN AME-IcA 10-17 (1955); EDWARDS, MAIN-
TAINING COMPETITION 113-20 (1949); Rostow, The New Sherman Act: A Positive
Instrument of Progress, 14 U. CHI. L. REv. 567, 568 (1947). Many writers stress the
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they would recommend extensive fragmentation of the large unit, even at the
cost of some impairment of performance."
However, the preservation of a relatively atomistic market structure may
well conflict with the economies of large-scale firms or be otherwise unsuited
to the economic realities of an industry. If so, a dilemma will present itself:
in order to perpetuate diffusion of industrial power, the government itself will
have to sanction and effectuate limitations on competitive behavior. For ex-
ample, expansion by a handful of efficient small firms to the optimum economic
size may eventually bring about the industrial concentration responsible for
the original fragmentation. 1 2 Also, unless small independent producers are
permitted to enter into agreements regulating their marketing practices, they
may destroy one another through excesses of competition.'" Accordingly, to
preserve that market structure considered most socially desirable, government
regulation of the economy must paradoxically take the form of restricting,
rather than increasing, the economic competition generally deemed the crux
of a free enterprise system.14
feasibility of breaking up multi-plant enterprises. See FTC, REPORT ON TEE DIvERGENCE
BETWEEN PLANT AND COMPANY CONCENTRATION, 1947 (1950).
11. DOUGLAS, DEMOCRACY AND FINANCE 14-16, 290-91 (1940); SIMONS, ECONOMIC
POLICY FOR A FREE SocIEry 57-60 (1948); Cf. EDWARDS, BIG BUSINESS AND THE POLICY
OF COMPETITION 1-10 (1956); STOCKING & WATKINS, MONOPOLY AND FREE ENTERPRISE
554 (1951) ; E. S. Mason, The New Competition, 43 YALE REv. 37, 41-42, 48 (1953).
"Congress .. .did not condone 'good trusts' and condemn 'bad' ones; it forbad
all. Moreover, in so doing it was not necessarily actuated by economic motives
alone. It is possible, because of its indirect social or moral effect, to prefer a system
of small producers, each dependent for his success upon his own skill and character,
to one in which the great mass of those engaged must accept the direction of a
few."
United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 427 (2d Cir. 1945) (opinion
by L. Hand, J.) ; see also id. at 428-29.
12. For a discussion of the conflict between economies of scale and the maintenance
of multi-firm industries, see BAIN, PRICE THEORY 153-54, 183-84 (1952); BURNS, THE
DECLINE OF COMPETITION 8-9 (1936) ; GALBRAITH, AMERICAN CAPITALISM c. IV (1952) ;
E. S. Mason, The Current Status of the Monopoly Problem in the United States, 62
HARV. L. REv. 1265, 1269 (1949).
13. Cf. Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933).
14. "[T]he fatal objection to this policy [a reduction in the size and an increase in
the number of firms to resurrect competition] is that it is self-defeating; it is funda-
mentally inconsistent with the maintenance of competition. Wherever a business
attained the maximum size permitted under the law, the stimuli present under
free competition would operate only in a very modified form. The inducement to
improve methods of production in order to reduce prices and thereby capture an
increasing share of the total business in the industry is eliminated. There is no
further inducement to price competition by such a firm."
BURNS, THE DECLINE OF COMPETITION 526 (1936).
Many commentators have lamented the anti-competitive consequences of an antitrust
policy directed against market share as such. See UNITED STATES DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
EFFECTIVE COMPETITION 16 (1952); GRIFFIN, op. cit. supra note 3, at 31-32; cf. United
States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 91 F. Supp. 333, 415 (S.D.N.Y. 1950). In this
19561
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
This dilemma is clearly reflected in the writings of Brandeis. Phrasing the
question of big business in social and political as well as in economic terms.
Brandeis foreshadowed both the conclusions and the problems of the structural
school. Before his appointment to the Supreme Court in 1916, Brandeis had
asserted that the small firm was economically more efficient than its giant
counterpart. He thus did not immediately encounter the dilemma confronting
the structural school, since he believed that an economy of small units was
consistent with economic realities and did not have to be fostered by competitive
restrictions. Yet the dilemma becomes apparent in several of Brandeis'
opinions as a member of the Supreme Court; his concern for small business
led him to resolve it by sacrificing competitive principles.
THE CURSE OF BIGNESS: IDEAS BEFORE 1916
Brandeis condemned the growing concentration of industrial power in
the United States in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as both
socially unhealthy and economically wasteful.' In contrast to the prevailing
opinion of his day toward the trust movement that was transforming the
economy,16 Brandeis labeled the trusts pathologies, regrettable deviations from
the normal development of capitalism.1 7 The corporate mechanism, he asserted,
was the device through which a handful of individuals gained unlimited control
over "other people's money," and dominated the interests of employees and
consumers.18
context, compare the interpretation of United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148
F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945) in REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO
STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAws 60 (1955) (hereinafter cited as ATT'Y GEN. REP.) "wjith that in
GRIFFIN, op. cit. supra note 3, at 29-31. See also E. S. Mason, The Current Status of the
Monopoly Problem in the United States, 62 HARV. L. REv. 1265, 1273-75 (1949) ; Adel-
man, Effective Competition and the Antitrust Laws, 61 HARV. L. REV. 1289, 1310-11
(1948).
15. "I think we are in a position, after the experience of the last 20 years, to state
two things: In the first place, that a corporation may well be too large to be the
most efficient instrument of production and of distribution, and, in the second place,
whether it has exceeded the point of greatest economic efficiency or not, it may
be too large to be tolerated among the people who desire to be free."
Statement of Brandeis, Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce
Pursuant to S. Res. 98, 62d Cong., 2d Sess., vol. I, at 1174 (1911) (hereinafter cited as
Interstate Commerce Hearings).
16. Cf. Wallace, Industrial Markets and Public Policy: Some Major Problems, 1
PuB. POLICY 59, 60-61 (1940). Though the trusts were sometimes criticized for utilizing
unfair competitive methods or charging unreasonable prices, most commentators believed
that the trusts were justified by superior efficiency and should not be broken up. See,
e.g., BOGART, THE ECo NoMIc HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 424-71 (2d ed. 1914);
MooDY, THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TRUSTS 494-96, 500-02 (1904) ; SEAGER & GULIcK, TRUST
AND CoRPORATION PROBLEMS 72-85, 654-71 (1929). But cf. Bullock, Trust Literature: A
Survey and Criticism, in TRUSTS, POOLS AND CORPORATIONS 428 (Ripley ed. 1905).
17. See Brandeis, Shall We Abandon the Policy of Competition? 18 CAsE & Com.
494, 495 (1912) ("There are no natural monopolies to-day in the industrial world.");
Lerner, The Social Thought of Mr. Justice Brandeis, 41 YALE L.J. 1, 18 (1931).
18. "Large dividends are the bribes which the managers tender the small investor
[Vol. 66:69
MR. JUSTICE BRANDEIS
Such an unequal distribution of economic power had dire repercussions in
a democracy, according to Brandeis.19 He saw the rise of bigness as causing
the extinction of the independent businessman, that entrepreneur whom eco-
nomic theory had glorified and held responsible for the successful functioning
of capitalism.2 0 Because he believed that "absolute power inevitably leads to
abuse," 21 Brandeis thought that the tendency of the trust leaders to exploit
labor and suppress unionism was a natural consequence of inequality of bargain-
ing position.
22
The business unit to Brandeis was more than an economic organization; it
was also an instrument of social growth.23 As the owners of individual enter-
prises and their helpers became the dependent servants of big business, Bran-
deis warned that society was being transformed into a nation of robots, unfit
to perform the duties which a democratic government demanded of its citi-
zens.2 4 In the large companies, labor was inevitably barred from participation
in managerial functions; consequently the creative potential of the average
for the power conferred to use other people's money." Interstate Commerce Hearings
1157.
Brandeis believed that the irresponsibility of the trusts was largely attributable to
the separation of ownership and control which characterized the publicly held corporation.
See id. at 1156-57; Steel Hearings 2843; address by Brandeis, The Regulation of Coln-
.petition Against the Regulation of Monopoly, Nov. 1, 1912, printed in THE CURSE OF
BIGNEss 109, 110-11 (Fraenkel ed. 1934); Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517,
565 (1933) (dissenting opinion of Brandeis, J.).
19. "Concentration of power has been shown to be dangerous in a democracy, even
though that power may be used beneficently." Statement of Brandeis, Final Report and
Testimony of tie Commission on Industrial Relations, S. Doc. No. 415, 64th Cong., 1st
Sess., vol. VIII, at 7663 (1915) (hereinafter cited as Industrial Relations Testinony);
see also Interstate Commerce Hearings 1166, 1167.
20. "[T]he displacement of the small independent business man by the huge corpora-
tion with its myriad of employees, its absentee ownership, and its financier control,
presents a grave danger to our democracy. The social loss is great; and there is
no economic gain."
Brandeis, Cutthroat Prices-The Competition That Kills, Harper's Weekly, Nov. 15, 1913,
p. 12, reprinted in BRANDEIS, BUSINEss-A PROFESSION 242, 260 (1933 ed.); see also
Brandeis, How the Combiners Combine, Harper's Weekly, Nov. 29, 1913, pp. 11-12, re-
printed in BRANDEIS, OrHER PEOPX'S MoNEY 28, 48-49 (1932 ed.) ; A. T. MAsoN, THE
BRANmEIs WAY 46 (1938) ; Richberg, The Industrial Liberalism of Justice Brandeis, 31
CoLum. L. REv. 1094, 1096 (1931); Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 568-69,
580 (1933) (dissenting opinion of Brandeis, J.).
21. Address by Brandeis, The New England Transportation Monopoly, Feb. 11, 1908,
printed in BRANDEIS, BusiNmss-A PROFESSI N 262, 278 (1933 ed.).
22. Industrial Relations Testinwny 7658-63; Steel Hearings 2855-57, 2870; address by
Brandeis, Big Business and Industrial Liberty, Feb. 10, 1912, printed in THE CURSE OF
BIGNESS 38 (Fraenkel ed. 1934).
23. "It is the development of manhood to which any industrial and social system
should be directed." Industrial Relations Testimony 7659.
24. See Steel Hearings 2841-43; Interstate Commerce Hearings 1166; miscellaneous
addresses by Brandeis from 1904 to 1915, printed in BRANDEIS, Busixzss-A PROFESSIOx
16-17, 29-32, 58-59, 342, 366-67 (1933 ed.) ; address by Brandeis, Industrial Co-operation,
May, 1905, printed in THE CURSE OF BIGNESS 35 (Fraenkel ed. 1934) ; see also letter from
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citizen was not developed within the work setting.25 In Brandeis' opinion, an
important advantage of the small concern was the sharing by labor of re-
sponsibility for the business's success. As a member of a cooperative enter-
prise, the individual worker contributed more to the job and got more out of
it.
2 6
For Brandeis big business was more than a social and political menace. He
further insisted that the trusts could not be justified in terms of the dual eco-
nomic standards of efficiency and progress. He took issue with that school
of thought which considered the giant corporation the inevitable product of
technological trends.27 Brandeis attributed the financial success of the early
twentieth century trusts primarily to their monopolistic control over prices,
and not to inherent cost-saving advantages.
28
Brandeis felt that an increase in size of a business unit after a discernible
point caused a sharp decrease in economic performance-a result of his strong
belief in the inefficiencies of management in a large firm. It was his opinion
that the "success or failure of an enterprise depends usually upon one man;
upon the quality of one man's judgment, and, above all things, his capacity
to see what is needed and ... to direct others. '2  He did not think a firm
could be efficiently managed unless it was small enough for the business leader
to participate actively in all operating decisions.30 And since there were
Brandeis to Norman Hapgood, Nov. 23, 1932, printed in A. T. MASoN, BRANDEIS: A FRE
MAN'S LIFE 602 (1946) ; letter from Brandeis to Robert Brure, Feb. 25, 1922, printed in
id. at 585.
25. "The grave objection to the large business is that, almost inevitably, the form of
organization, the absentee stockholdings, and its remote directorship prevent partici-
pation ... of the employees in such management .... Thus we lose that necessary
cooperation which naturally flows from contact between employers and employees-
and which the American aspirations for democracy demand."
Industrial Relations Testimony 7660. See also Brandeis, The Living Law, 10 I1.. L. REv.
461,463 (1916).
26. Industrial Relations Testimony 7659-60, 7663-64. See also A. T. MASON, BRAN-
DEIS: A FRxE MAN'S LIFE 642 (1946).
27. See notes 16, 17 supra.
Brandeis believed that both lax enforcement and inadequacies of federal antitrust law
prior to 1914 were major factors in the success of the trust movement. See statement
of Brandeis, Hearings Before the House Committee on the Judiciary on Trust Legisla-
tion, (Clayton Committee), 63d Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 7, pt. 16, at 665 (1914).
28. Brandeis, Competition (1913), in THE CURSE OF BIGNESS 112 (Fraenkel ed.
1934); Brandeis, Trusts, the Export Trade and the New Party, Collier's Weekly, Sept.
21, 1912, p. 10, reprinted in BRANDEIS, BUSINEss-A PROFESSION 225 (1933 ed.) ; Bran-
deis, Trusts, Efficiency and the New Party, Collier's Weekly, Sept. 14, 1912, p. 14, re-
printed in id. at 205; Brandeis, Shall We Abandon the Policy of Competition?, 18 CASE
& Com. 494 (1912) ; Interstate Commerce Hearings 1148, 1157, 1245.
29. Id. at 1147.
30. Id. at 1147-48; Brandeis, Competition (1913), in THE CURSE OF BIGNESS 112,
116-17 (Fraenkel ed. 1934); argument of Brandeis, Evidence Taken by the Interstate
Commerce Commission in the Matter of Proposed Advances in Freight Rates by Carriers,
S. Doc. No. 725, 61st Cong., 3d Sess., vol. VIII, at 5255-56 (1911).
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discernible limits on human capacity, there were corresponding limits on the
maximum size of a manageable unit.31
Brandeis also considered the large corporation, which necessarily possessed
substantial elements of monopoly power, an ineffective instrument of industrial
progress. He thought the trusts of his day had shown extreme sluggishness
in improving manufacturing techniques. Secure in their position and guar-
anteed the current level of profits by following standard methods, they had
been content to adopt an attitude of complacency, with the consequent de-
celeration of technological advancement. 32
Brandeis' belief in the superior economic performance of the small business en-
terprise, combined with his distrust of private concentration of power, naturally
led him to advocate government dissolution of the giant corporations of his day.
Replacement of the trust by a multiplicity of small units was for Brandeis merely
restoration of a normally functioning brand of capitalism; it was not an attempt
to create competition artificially. Moreover, he insisted it was not necessary for
the state to limit the natural growth of competitors in order to preserve compe-
tition among large numbers. He saw nothing in our industrial history which
indicated that an enterprise could gain control of a market solely by reason
of superior efficiency and progressiveness. 33 Rather, the role of the govern-
ment in Brandeis' ideal economic world was to prevent those unfair practices
which the trusts had originally used to usurp market control. Merger of inde-
pendents to obtain monopoly power over prices, or annihilation of competitors
by price discrimination, were not the legitimate economic weapons of a capital-
ist.3A While the state acted to police such tactics, the incentives inherent in a
31. Address by Brandeis, The Neu, England Transportation Monopoly, Feb. 11, 1908,
printed in BRANDEIS, BusiNEss-A PROFESSION 262, 275-76 (1933 ed.).
32. Brandeis, Big Men and Little Business, Harper's Weekly, Jan. 3, 1914, p. 11,
reprinted in BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S Mo NEY 135, 149-52 (1932 ed.) ; Brandeis, Com-
petition (1913), in THE CURSE OF BIGNEss 112, 118-21 (Fraenkel ed. 1934) ; Interstate
Commerce Hearings 1149-50, 1208.
33. See Brandeis, Competition (1913), in THE CURSE OF BIGNESS 112, 114-16, 124
(Fraenkel ed. 1934) ; address by Brandeis, Social Justice and the Trusts, Dec. 18, 1912,
quoted in A. T. MAsoN, BRANDEIS: A FREE MAN'S LIFE 352 (1946) ; Interstate Coin-
merce Hearings 1234, 1245.
34. For discussion by Brandeis of unfair competitive methods, see statement by
Brandeis, Hearings Before the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce
on Regulation of Prices, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. 198 (1915) ; Brandeis, Cutthroat Prices-
The Competition That Kills, Harper's Weekly, Nov. 15, 1913, p. 12; Brandeis, The
Solution of the Trust Problem, Harper's Weekly, Nov. 8, 1913, p. 18; Brandeis, Shall
We Abandon the Policy of Competition?, 18 CASE & Co.M. 494 (1912) ; Interstate Com-
merce Hearings 1162, 1170, 1173; cf. MASON, THE BRANDEIS WAY 68, 72 (1938). See
also FTC v. Gratz, 253 U.S. 421, 429 (1920) (dissenting opinion, of Brandeis, J.) ; Leitch
'Mfg. Co. v. Barber Co., 302 U.S. 458 (1938) (opinion by Brandeis, J.); Carbice Corp.
v. American Patents Development Corp., 233 U.S. 27 (1931) (opinion by Brandeis, J.).
The unfair practices stressed by Brandeis were discriminatory sharpshooting, spying
on competitors, espionage, bribery of competitors' employees and government officials,
establishing bogus competition and "fake independents," discrimination against producers
or customers who would not deal exclusively with the combination, railroad rebates, ex-
clusion of competitors from access to raw material, and tying contracts.
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system of fair competition of many producers would guarantee optimum per-
formance.35
Thus, the economic ideal expounded by Louis Brandeis prior to his appoint-
ment to the Supreme Court in 1916 resembled the competitive model developed
by classical economic thought.36 For Brandeis as for classical economics, an
economy dominated by a multitude of small units was a political and eco-
nomic blessing. Diffusion of private power meant that no producer would
have any power to misuse.3 7 The effort of the individual competitor to in-
crease his market share by improving product quality or reducing produc-
tion cost meant that consumers would enjoy the fruits of efficiency and pro-
gress.
In one respect, however, the classical system and the pre-1916 Brandeis
system diverged sharply. For the classical economist, trade unions not only
were a monopolistic interference with the free functioning of the factor
market but also impeded the mobilit
, 
of labor by restrictive provisions3 s In
contrast, Brandeis believed that "constructive" unionism had a real place in
the American economy. Labor organizations would act as a bulwark against
the tendency of the individual competitor to maximize his profit by lowering
the wages or lengthening the hours of his employees.3 9 Unlike the trusts,
which possessed the financial resources to withstand long strikes and other
self-help activities of labor, the small producer of the Brandeis ideal would
have to meet his combined employees on equal terms.4 0 To guard against the
possibility of a union's dominating the individual employer, just as he believed
35. Brandeis, Competition (1913), in THE CURSE OF BIGNESS 112 (Fraenkel ed.
1934) ; address by Brandeis, The Regulation of Competition Against the Regulation of
Monopoly, Nov. 1, 1912, printed in id. at 109; Brandeis, The Ncw Haven-An Unregulated
Monopoly (1912), in BusIN-ss-A PROFESSIOx 286, 295-99 (1933 ed.) ; Interstate Com-
inerce Hearings 1157-58, 1235-36; see also LiFz, BRANDEIS: THE PERSONAL HISTORY
OF AN AMERICAN IDEAL 123 (1936).
36. See BAIN, PRICE THEORY c. 4 (1952); GALBRAITH, AMERICAN CAPITALISM CC.
II-IV (1952).
37. Brandeis' distrust of unchecked power in private hands had a conceptual influence
on his political as well as his economic thinking. E.g., in Myers v. United States, 272
U.S. 52 (1926), Brandeis dissented from the Court's holding that the President, without
Senatorial approval, could remove from office a postmaster appointed with the advice
and consent of the Senate:
"The doctrine of the separation of powers was adopted . . . not to promote
efficiency but to preclude the exercise of arbitrary power. The purpose was, not
to avoid friction, but, by means of the inevitable friction incident to the distribution
of the governmental powers among three departments, to save the people from
autocracy."
Id. at 293 (dissenting opinion of Brandeis, J.).
38. Cf. Simons, Some Reflections on Syndicalism, 52 J. PoL. EcoN. 1, 7-8, 12 (1944).
39. Industrial Relations Testimony 7657-81; Steel Hearings 2855-58, 2862, 2870;
Interstate Commerce Hearings 1155-56, 1180-83; address by Brandeis, The Employer and
Trades Unions, April 21, 1904, printed in BRANDEIS, BUSINESs-A PROFESSION 13 (1933
ed.). See also THE CURSE OF BIGNESS 43-47 (Fraenkel ed. 1934).
40. Industrial Relations Testimony 7658-63.
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the giant corporation dominated labor, Brandeis advised the independent com-
petitors of each industry to form an employer's organization for collective
,bargaining purposes.41  Moreover he insisted that an irresponsible union
was as much of a social menace as an omnipotent corporation.42
THE DILEMMA: ITs BACKGROUND
Brandeis' analysis of the economic potential of the large enterprise has
been severely questioned. Commentators have called attention to the economies
of large-scale production and distribution,43 the contribution of modern mana-
gerial techniques to efficient corporate leadership,44 the technological advance-
ment springing from the research laboratories of the large companies. 45
Such arguments failed to deter Brandeis' crusade against bigness; as a member
of the Supreme Court, he continued to warn of the social and political disad-
vantages of a concentrated economy.46 However the economic wastes of the
large enterprise-a theme of his earlier pronouncements-are not stressed in
his opinions.
41. Brandeis, Shall We Abandon the Policy of Competition?, 18 CASE & Coss. 494,
496 (1912) ; Interstate Commerce Hearings 1183, 1250.
42. See note 39 supra.
Brandeis opposed the closed shop, because he believed union leaders were thereby
accorded too great a control over the labor market. "I should no more think of giving
absolute power to unions than I should of giving to capital monopoly power." Interstate
Commerce Hearings 1180. He favored instead a preferential union shop, whereby prefer-
ence in employment was given a "qualified" union member. Industrial Relations Testi-
nmony 7680-81; see also A. T. MASON, BRANDEIS-A FERE MAN'S LIFE 294-315 (1946).
For a complete picture of Brandeis' views on the benefits and responsibilities of union-
ism, see his opinions in Senn v. Tile Layers' Protective Union, 301 U.S. 468 (1937);
Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Journeymen Stone Cutters' Ass'n, 274 U.S. 37, 56 (1927)
(dissenting opinion) ; Dorchy v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 306 (1926) ; Truax v. Corrigan, 257
U.S. 312, 354 (1921) (dissenting opinion); Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254
U.S. 443, 479 (1921) (dissenting opinion); Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245
U.S. 229, 263 (1917) (dissenting opinion).
43. See, e.g., LILIENTHAL, BIG BUSINESS: A NEW ERA (1952); DRUCKER, THE
CONCEPT OF THE CORPORATION (1946).
A few modern writers have evaluated Brandeis' views on the efficiency of big
business. Compare DRUCKER, op. cit. supra at 224 ("Mr. Brandeis maintained that bigness
was economically inefficient. We know today that in modern industrial production ...
the small unit is not only inefficient, it cannot produce at all.") with QUINN, I QUIT
MONSTER BUSINESS 21 (1948) ("The late Justice Brandeis saw with prophetic vision
the decreasing efficiency of monster companies as they were to reach out for more and
more subsidiaries.").
44. See, e.g., SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DFocRAcy cc. VII, VIII
(2d ed. 1942); MACLAURIN, INVENTION AND INNOVATION IN THE RADIO INDUSTRY CC.
VIII, IX (1949).
45. See, e.g., GORDON, BUSINESS LEADERSHIP IN THE LARGE CORPORATION (1945).
46. See, e.g., Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 565 (1933) (dissenting
opinion) :
"The typical business corporation of the last century, owned by a small group
of individuals, managed by their owners, and limited in size by their personal wealth,
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Since Brandeis, at least prior to 1916, believed that the small unit was
capable of a level of economic performance superior to that of the large firm,
he had logically concluded that the former would do better than hold its
own if given merely the chance to compete with the latter on equal terms.4 7
Thus, the government need only "make competition possible" to destroy big-
ness; it did not have to subsidize the small firm in the competitive struggle or
give it advantages that were denied the large enterprise. Confident of the
economic potential of the small firm, Brandeis had not fully considered the
need to protect small business by obstructing the natural operation of com-
petitive forces.
As a member of the Supreme Court, Brandeis was squarely faced with this
problem in a series of cases. And in his opinions Brandeis sanctioned non-
competitive concerted action by individual producers, as well as affirmative
government aid for selected competitors, if the result of such conduct was to
perpetuate smallness. His willingness to approve sharp deviations from com-
petitive principles in order to avoid a concentrated economy indicates the
dilemma of the apostles of small business.
COMPETITION AND THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
Discriminatory State Taxation
In Quaker City Cab Co. v. Pennsylvania,4" the Supreme Court held un-
constitutional a state tax on the gross receipts earned by corporations from the
intrastate transportation of freight or passengers. Observing that plaintiff cor-
poration was competing with individuals and partnerships that escaped taxa-
tion under the statute, the majority asserted that the corporate tax would
violate the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if the classi-
fication made by the statute was found to be arbitrary.49 The Court held a
discrimination based solely on the character of the business's owner an illogical
ground of distinction. 50
Dissenting, Mr. Justice Brandeis maintained that a state was not consti-
tutionally prohibited from subjecting a corporation to heavier taxation than
is being supplanted by huge concerns in which the lives of tens or hundreds of
thousands of employees and the property of tens or hundreds of thousands of in-
vestors are subjected, through the corporate mechanism, to the control of a few
men."
47. "I believe if it were possible today to make the corporations act in accordance
with what doubtless all of us would agree should be the rules of trade no huge
corporation would be created, or, if created, would be successful. . . . I am so
convinced of the economic fallacy in a huge unit that if we make competition
possible, if we create conditions where there could be reasonable competition .. .
these monsters would fall to the ground ..
Interstate Commerce Hearings 1170.
48. 277 U.S. 389 (1928).
49. The Court held that the equal protection clause applied to corporations as well
as natural persons. Id. at 400.
50. Id. at 399-402.
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its unincorporated competitors. He thought that the classification made by
the statute was not arbitrary, but a reflection of inherent dissimilarities in
forms of business organization. In supporting the distinction as rational,
Brandeis reiterated the harmful social consequences which he felt accompanied
the aggregation of capital through corporations: the "insidious menace to the
liberty of the citizen," the "subjection of labor to capital," the impairment of
individual initiative and lessening of creative power.51
Brandeis elaborated these ideas in his dissenting opinion in Louis K. Liggett
Co. v. Lce.5 2 In this case the Court held constitutional that part of a Florida
law which provided that the license fee for the operation of a single retail
store should increase progressively with the total number of stores owned and
operated by the licensee. The Court felt that differences in the methods of
merchandising employed by a chain of stores and the individually operated
single store justified the state's imposition of a heavier tax per unit on the
multi-unit enterprise.53 But a majority of the Court voided as arbitrary that
provision of the statute which further increased the fee per store if the licensee
operated stores in more than one county.5 4
Disagreeing with the latter holding, Brandeis observed that the legislation
was not designed primarily to raise revenue but "to protect the individual,
independently-owned, retail stores from the competition of chain stores." 55
The plaintiffs in this case were thirteen corporations, each of which operated
an intrastate chain of retail stores. Since the opportunity of doing business in
corporate form was a state-granted privilege, the sovereign could attach any
conditions to its exercise which it desired. Accordingly, since the corporation
was free to reject the offer, the state was within its rights if it charged a
higher price for the privilege of locating stores in more than one county.50
Underlying the anti-chain store legislation, Brandeis saw a public fear of the
domination of retail distribution by the large corporation:
"[T]he chief aim of the Florida statute is apparently to handicap
corporate chain stores-that is, to place them at a disadvantage, to make
their success less probable. No other justification of the discrimination
in license fees need be shown; since the very purpose of the legislation
is to create inequality and thereby to discourage the establishment, or
the maintenance, of corporate chain stores . "5
51. Id.at4lO.
52. 288U.S. 517 (1933).
53. Id. at 532-33.
54. Id. at 533-34. The majority opinion stressed that the establishment of a new store
in a different county did not by itself justify imposition of a higher tax on those stores
which had previously been established within a single county.
55. Id. at 541.
56. Id. at 545.
57. Id. at 575.
Emphasizing that the individual retailers of Florida were engaged in "a struggle for
existence," id. at 568, Brandeis pointed out that a goal of the statute was "to preserve the
competition of the independent stores with the chain stores," id. at 569-70. "[I]nstead of
absolutely prohibiting the corporate chain store, the State might conclude that it should
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Brandeis' support of discriminatory taxation, designed solely to place one
group of market participants at a competitive disadvantage, is in direct
conflict with the economic philosophy of the classical system of free enter-
prise15 In classical economic terms, such government subsidization of favored
competitors to improve their chances of commercial success would impede
the operation of the natural laws of competition, whereby the marginal pro-
ducer was driven from the market by his more efficient rivals. By subjecting
the chain store to a heavier burden of taxation than the owner of a single
store, the state would also be discouraging the establishment of optimum scale
enterprises within the industry, to the consumer's detriment.50
Although Brandeis had, prior to his Court appointment, advocated state
action to eliminate unfair competitive methods, he significantly did not justify
Florida's discriminatory taxation of chain store operators in terms of this
objective. Nowhere in the course of his long Liggett dissent does Brandeis
suggest that the chains have resorted to unfair practices to slaughter the
independent proprietor. True, some observers have felt that, prior to the
passage of the Robinson-Patman Act,60 a major factor in the success of the
chain store was not superior efficiency but rather the bargaining advantages
conferred by size.61 Although use of buying power to obtain price concessions
first try the more temperate remedy of curbing the chain by imposing the handicap of dis-
criminatory license fees." Id. at 574.
Brandeis observed that the Florida statute by its terms did not apply only to large cor-
porate chains, but also to a small number of stores commonly owned by either a corporation
or an individual. But he added that the chain tax law was clearly directed against the large
corporations and was framed in broader terms to avoid constitutional difficulties. Id. at 576.
58. Although the Court's sole function in the Liggett case was to decide the constitu-
tionality of the challenged statute, Brandeis' defense of anti-chain store taxes in his dissent
clearly reflects his personal belief in the wisdom of this form of legislation. Such a con-
clusion is bolstered by Brandeis' letter to Fred Howe, March 22, 1936, contained in the
Brandeis papers in the Library of the University of Louisville Law School. Asked to sug-
gest devices to limit corporation size in order to encourage small enterprise, Brandeis re-
plied:
"To limit corporation size, I suggest an annual excise tax, rapidly progressing
in the rate as the total capitalization of the corporation rises-the amount of the
capitalization to be measured by the aggregate face value of (a) its stock, bonds and
similar securities (all stocks to have a stated par value) plus (b) the aggregate
value of the stocks, bonds and other securities of all subsidiary or other corporations
of which it holds as much as twenty per cent of the outstanding stock and/or bonds
or other securities."
59. For an economic criticism of anti-chain store taxation, see, e.g., MORRIS, THE
ECONOMICS OF THE SPECIAL TAXATION OF CHAIN STORES 4-5 (1937); Burns, The Anti-
trust Laws and the Regulation of Price Competition, 4 LAw & CONTEmP. PRoB. 301, 320
(1937) ; FTC, Final Report on the Chain-Store Investigation, S. Doc. No. 4, 74th Cong.,
1st Sess. 91-92 (1934) ; cf. HOFFMAN, LARGE-SCALE ORGANIZATION IN THE FOOD INDIJS-
TRIES 154-56 (TNEC Monograph 35, 1940).
60. 49 STAT. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1952), amending 38 STAT. 730 (1914).
61. See AuSTIN, PRIcE DISCRIMINATION AND RELATED PROBLEMS UNDER THE RO]BIN-
SON-PATMAN ACT 8-11 (1953 ed.); H.R. REP. No. 2287, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 3-6, 17
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may be classified an "unfair method of competition, '6 2 Brandeis' support of
discriminatory taxation in the Quaker City and Liggett cases is not predicated
on this ground. Moreover, discriminatory taxation would appear to be an
inappropriate regulatory device to annul the bargaining advantages enjoyed by
the larger firms. Such a tax is automatically imposed on a designated class of
business enterprises, without a demonstration that a specific competitor is
profitably employing "unfair" bargaining pressures.0 3
Brandeis' defense of discriminatory taxation in the Quaker City and Liggett
cases is basically in social terms . 4 Although the large corporate unit is legiti-
(1936) ; S. REP. No. 1502, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1936) ; FTC, Final Report on the
Chain-Store Investigation, S. Doc. No. 4, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 24-28, 53-63 (1934).
The cost-saving advantages which chain stores enjoy over independents are generally
attributed both to the bargaining advantages of size and to the economies of large-scale
operation. See BECKMAN & NOLEN, THE CHAIN STORE PROBLEM C. IV (1937); FULDA,
FOOD DISTRIBUTION IN THE UNITED STATES, THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN INDEPENDENTS AND
CHAINS C. II (1951) ; HOFFMAN, op. cit. supra note 59, c. VII; ZORN & FELDMAN, BUSI-
NESS UNDER THE NEW PRICE LAWS c. I (1937) ; McNair, Marketing Functions and Costs
and the Robinson-Patinan Act, 4 LAW & CONTETP. PROB. 334 (1937). In State Board of
Tax Commissioners v. Jackson, 283 U.S. 527 (1931), the Supreme Court sustained the
constitutionality of an annual license tax on stores increasing progressively with the total
number of stores under common ownership. Concluding that a distinction between chain
stores and independently owned units was a reasonable basis of classification for tax pur-
poses, the Court, per Roberts, J. (Brandeis concurring), identified differences in merchan-
dising employed by the two types of distributive organizations. Most of these differences
relate to the efficiencies and economies effected through mass distribution; see id. at 534-35.
See also the opinion of the Florida Supreme Court in the Liggett case, Louis K. Liggett
Co. v. Amos, 104 Fla. 609, 622-23, 627-28, 141 So. 153, 158, 160 (1932) ("We know of no
reason ... for relieving superior skill, initiative, and industry from the payment of a tax.").
62. But, for the position that the exercise of bargaining power by large retail organi-
zations is a legitimate and beneficial feature of the modern American economy, see GAL-
BRAITH, AMERICAN CAPITALISM 147-50 (1952); COUNCIL OF EcoNoMIc ADVISORS, THIRD
ANNUAL REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 15 (1948); Rowe, Price Discrimination, Competition,
and Confusion: Another Look at Robinson-Pa tman, 60 YALE L.J. 929, 950-51 (1951). See
also authorities cited note 122 infra.
63. For example, a retail unit may be vertically integrated with its suppliers, or may
purchase the entire output of a manufacturing unit. In such a case, price discrimination,
the major evil associated with exertion of bargaining pressures by large purchasers, would
not be responsible for cost savings. See FULDA, op. cit. supra note 61, at 12-19.
The FTC's Final Report on the Chain-Store Investigation, S. Doc. No. 4, 74th Cong.,
1st Sess. 91 (1934), rejected federal taxation of chain stores as a method of regulating dis-
tributive outlets, because "to tax out of existence the advantages of chain stores over com-
petitors is to tax out of existence the advantages which the consuming public have found
in patronizing them.. . ." The Report feared that a graduated tax on chains "will also tend
toward an arbitrary frustration of whatever saving in cost of production and distribution
results from integration of the functions of producer, wholesaler, and retailer." Id. at 91-92.
64. "The citizens of the State... may have believed that the chain store, by furthering
the concentration of wealth and of power and by promoting absentee ownership, is
thwarting American ideals; that it is making impossible equality of opportunity;
that it is converting independent tradesmen into clerks; and that it is sapping the
resources, the vigor and the hope of the smaller cities and towns."
Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 568-69 (1933) (dissenting opinion).
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mately winning the competitive struggle in transportation and retail distribu-
tion, preservation of the individual businessman is socially desirable and
justifies government mitigation of the rigors of the competitive process.
Such a position is incomprehensible to the "performance" school of antitrust
thinking. Its adherents would contend that the state should protect competi-
tion, not competitors; that such discriminatory taxation penalizes the chain
stores because their performance has been too good; that the competition
of a handful of chains is the optimum market structure in terms of consumer
welfare.6 5 But to Brandeis some sacrifice of performance was apparently
a cheap price to pay for industrial decentralization. 0
Excesses of Fair Competition
As Brandeis pointed out in his dissent in New State Ice Co. v. Liebinann.6 7
the state might need to protect small firms from the competition of other small
firms as well as from that of the large. In this case a majority of the Court
held unconstitutional an Oklahoma statute which declared the manufacture
and distribution of ice a public business, and which provided that no new
ice plant could be constructed unless a license was first obtained from the
state. The latter would be issued only if the applicant established that existing
facilities were insufficient to serve the public needs. Liebmann, though un-
licensed, had commenced construction of an ice plant for the purpose of com-
peting with the New State Ice Company. When the latter sought an injunction,
Liebmann asserted that the state statute violated the Fourteenth Amendment. 5
A majority of the Justices refused to extend the traditional category of
businesses affected with the public interest to include the ice business. The
ice industry was "essentially private in its nature" ;09 accordingly, the legis-
lature could not constitutionally restrict the number of participants. The
Court felt that the effect of the statute was to "shut out new enterprises, and
thus create and foster monoply in the hands of existing establishments, against,
rather than in aid of, the interest of the consuming public. '70
Brandeis agreed that the purpose of the statute was to prevent competition.
But he added that free competition was not necessarily beneficial to the con-
65. See GRIFFIN, AN ECONOMIC APPROACH TO ANTITRUST PROBLEMS 35-36, 68-69
(1951) ; Carlston, Antitrust Policy: A Problem in Statecraft, 60 YALE L.J. 1073, 1082-83
(1.951).
Many writers have emphasized that ease of entry is an effective check against monopo-
lization in distribution. See GALBRAITH, AMERICAN CAPITALISM 148-49 (1952); Rowe,
supra note 62, at 950-51.
66. Brandeis' endorsement of taxation as a feasible means of retarding industrial con-
centration is of more than mere historical interest. It has recently been suggested that
federal tax policy should be influenced by the goal of promoting small business. H.R. REP.
No. 2683, 83d Cong., 2d Se'ss. 37-46 (1954) ; H.R. REP. No. 1610, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 13-
32 (1954) ; statement by Senator Fulbright, N.Y. Times, March 16, 1956, p. 11, col. 1.
67. 285 U.S. 262 (1932).
.68. Id. at 271-72, 281.
69. Id. at 277.
70. Id. at 278.
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sumer. In Brandeis' opinion, the Oklahoma law was not an arbitrary infringe-
ment of individual rights, but a measure justified by the economic circum-
stances of the industry, which he reviewed.
Because of transportation barriers the business was carried on by local
plants with narrowly limited market areas. The product was undifferentiated,
and a new ice plant could be constructed with relative ease. The demand of
any market area for ice was inelastic. Since ice plants had a determinate pro-
ductive capacity, and the costs of production were mostly fixed costs, erection
of a new plant in a locality already adequately served usually resulted in cut-
throat competition. These tactics eventually redounded to the disadvantage
of the consumer. Both competing units might go bankrupt, in which case the
community would be without any ice. If an agreement was made to share
the market and each unit produced a fraction of the output, productive capacity
would be idle; production costs and prices would be higher than necessary,
because of the declining average cost schedule for the individual firm. The
purpose of the legislation was to prevent the wastes inherent in "unnecessary
duplication of facilities," which is "likely to bring high rates and poor ser-
vice.''71 Moreover, even though the statute fostered monopoly, the licensed ice
plants did not have monopoly power over prices. For the state could terminate
the license of any company that was not adequately serving the public.12
Like discriminatory taxation, government restriction of a potential com-
petitor's freedom to enter an industry is inconsistent with the tenets of classical
economic thought. But Biandeis observed that, in light of the high overhead
and transportation costs which characterized the ice industry, unbridled com-
petition among many producers would yield economically wasteful results.73
Under these circumstances, he was willing to sanction as a reasonable ex-
periment 74 the competitive restrictions which the statute imposed, despite his
personal fear that "the remedy might bring evils worse than the present
disease." 75
71. Id. at 282; see also id. at 291-92.
72. Id. at 304.
73. "A certificate of public convenience and necessity . . .was unknown to the com-
mon law .... [Its] introduction in the United States ... marked the growing con-
viction that under certain circumstances free competition might be harmful to the
community and that, when it was so, absolute freedom to enter the business of one's
choice should be denied."
Id. at 282.
74. For discussion by Brandeis of the state's constitutional power to experiment in the
interest of solving social and economic problems, see id. at 310-11.
75. Id. at 309. Brandeis doubted whether any governmental agency could successfully
perform the huge task of determining when construction of another ice plant somewhere
within the state would serve the public interest. See id. at 309-10. The economic planning
under scrutiny in the New State case was for him a substitution of the inefficiencies of
"big government" for the evils accompanying unrestricted entry into the industry. Thus,
Brandeis would probably have voted against the law if he had been a member of the Okla-
homa legislature, unless he would have felt that the alternative was state socialization of
the industry. See note 76 infra and accompanying text.
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It should also be noted that one of the consequences of the policy adopted
by the Oklahoma legislature was to foster small business. For even with the estab-
lishment of the series of local monopolies contemplated by the statute, the
average plant in the Oklahoma ice industry would remain a small one, just
large enough to serve the needs of the natural market area immediately around
it. Unless the state restricted freedom of entry, a multiplicity of small firms
would either destroy one another or provide inadequate service. And, if
private firms could not assure a sufficient supply at reasonable prices, Brandeis
warned that the state itself might decide to operate the ice business. 7'3 Thus,
to preserve a market structure predicated on small, privately run concerns,
Brandeis had again sanctioned governmental interference with the competitive
process.
COMPETITION AND THE SHERMAN ACT
Brandeis' economic philosophy influenced his interpretation of the broad
language of the Sherman Antitrust Act.77 His opinions reflect the belief that
the main purpose of the legislation was to curb the concentration of industrial
power in the American economy and prevent the annihilation of small business.
"Restraints" Promoting Competition
Brandeis spoke for a unanimous Court in 1918, when he declared that the
"call" rule of the Chicago Board of Trade did not violate section 1 of the
Sherman Act.7 s This rule prohibited members of the Board from offering to
purchase, during the period between business sessions, grain "to arrive"70
at a price other than the closing bid of the preceding session. Brandeis rejected
the government's contention that an agreement fixing the offering price of
grain during an extended time period was per se an illegal restraint of trade."0
He held that the Court must ascertain whether the nature and effect of the
76. Id. at 304-05. Brandeis noted that, under prior Court decisions, the due process
clause would not prevent a state from engaging in the business of supplying its residents
with necessary commodities if private enterprise failed to do an adequate job. Accordingly,
Brandeis argued, a state could constitutionally exercise the lesser power of restricting entry
into an industry in order to foster economic stability and aid private distributors. Since
a state that decides to take over a business "may exert the taxing power all individual
dealers may be driven from the calling by the unequal competition. If States are denied
the power to prevent the harmful entry of a few individuals into a business, they may thus,
in effect, close it altogether to private enterprise." Id. at 305.
77. 26 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1952).
78. Board of Trade of Chicago v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
79. I.e., grain already in transit to the market or to be shipped within a specified time.
Id. at 236.
80. "The case [of the government] was rested upon the bald proposition, that a rule
or agreement by which men occupying positions of strength in any branch of trade,
fixed prices at which they would buy or sell during an important part of the business




"irestraint" were to suppress or to promote competition.,, Brandeis found that
the "call" rule applied only during a part of each business day, applied only
to a fraction of the grain shipped to Chicago, and had no appreciable effect on
total volume or general prices.8 2 He also maintained that adoption of the
rule had distributed the business in grain "to arrive" among a far larger
number of market participants than had been the case before.83
The Justice's reasoning in Chicago Board of Trade mirrored his conviction
that, for purposes of the antitrust statutes, no business practice was legal or
illegal per se.84 He asserted that the Court should examine all relevant data
and then determine whether the consequences of the price-fixing agreement
attacked by the government were socially or economically beneficial.8 5 And
81. "The legality of an agreement or regulation cannot be determined by so simple a
test, as whether it restrains competition. Every agreement concerning trade, every
regulation of trade, restrains. To bind, to restrain, is of their very essence. The
true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and
perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress or even
destroy competition."
Ibid.
82. Id. at 239.
83. Id. at 240. Brandeis found that the promulgation of the "call" rule had shifted the
bulk of the trading in grain "to arrive" from private transactions dominated by a few
dealers to the Board's regular competitive sessions.
84. Cf. the method of analysis adopted by Brandeis in Standard Oil Co. v. United
States, 283 U.S. 163 (1931). Several major oil companies had independently developed
and patented cracking processes, a method of refining which increased the gasoline yield
from given quantities of crude oil. The companies then formed a patent pool, whereby each
competitor gained equal access to the patents of all and was released from liability for past
infringements of others' patents. The pooling arrangement also included a formula for
determination and division of royalties received under licensing agreements with independ-
ent concerns. The government claimed, inter alia, that such an agreement tended to in-
crease the fees to be paid by licensees, and thus the manufacturing cost of "cracked" gaso-
line, through elimination of competition between the pool's members in the issuance of
licenses under their respective patents.
In rejecting the contention that the pooling arrangement violated the Sherman Act,
Brandeis, speaking for a unanimous Court, first asserted that patent interchange agree-
ments among competitors "may promote rather than restrain competition" by eliminating
the obstacle to technical progress inherent in potential infringement suits. Id. at 171. To
determine whether the patent pool in question unreasonably restrained interstate commerce,
Brandeis found it necessary to make a thorough investigation of "the operation and effect
of the challenged contracts." Id. at 175. In view of the fact that twenty-one independently-
owned cracking processes were beyond the control of the pool, and cracked gasoline con-
stituted only 26% of total gasoline production, Brandeis concluded that competition within
the industry was not impaired by defendants' control of royalty rates. "No monopoly of
any kind, or restraint of interstate commerce, has been effected. . . . To warrant an in-
junction which would invalidate the contracts here in question ... there must be a definite
factual showing of illegality." Id. at 179. (Emphasis added.) See also AT'Y GEN. RaP.
245 n.96.
85. "IT]he court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the business to which
the restraint is applied; its condition 'before and after the restraint was imposed;
the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or probable. The history of the
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Brandeis tended to judge the results of alleged violations of the Sherman Act
in terms of the dichotomy of small and big business, approving that conduct
which maintained diffusion of economic power.8 6
Resale Price Maintenance
Prior to Brandeis' appointment, the Supreme Court had held an agreement
by which a manufacturer bound dealers to resell his product at a fixed price
an illegal restraint of trades 7 In 1918 the issue was again raised in Boston
Store v. American Graphophone Co.,8 8 which concerned the right of a manu-
facturer of patented articles to hold retailers to a designated resale price.
Continuing the trend of prior cases, a majority of the Court reiterated that
the price-fixing contract was "contrary to the general law" and "not within
the monopoly conferred by the patent law."8' 9 Yielding to the principle of
restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular remedy,
the purpose or end sought to be attained, are all relevant facts."
Board of Trade of Chicago v. United States, 246, U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
Brandeis took no part in the consideration or decision of the famous case of United
States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927), which, by a 5-3 vote, established
the maxim that price-fixing agreements are conclusively presumed to violate the Sherman
Act. See also United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 228 (1940) ("[P]rice-
fixing combinations ... are illegal per se; they are not evaluated in terms of their purpose,
aim or effect in the elimination of so-called competitive evils."). Trenton Potteries dis-
tinguished the Chicago Board of Trade case as referring to the temporary maintenance of
a price determined by competitive forces on the floor of an exchange; see id. at 401. Never-
theless, in view of the language and focus of Brandeis' opinion in the earlier case, he would
probably have disapproved the broad holding in Trenton Potteries, which compelled courts
to invalidate price-fixing agreements without considering the economic circumstances of
which they were a product. The opinion of Chief Justice Hughes in Appalachian Coals,
Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933), clearly bears the Brandeis imprint; see espe-
cially id. at 360-61.
See also statement of Prof. Milton Handler, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on
Antitrnst and Monopoly of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary on a Study of the Anti-
trust Laws, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 36-39 (1955). Prof. Handler testified that one
factor which in the past had increased the difficulties of antitrust enforcement was the
interpretation of the rule of reason by Justice Brandeis in the Chicago Board of Trade
case. Since this construction required a factual showing of illegality in each case and
deemed relevant evidence relating to trade conditions and the nature of the restraint effected,
the scope of litigation was broadened to almost unmanageable proportions.
86. It is today accepted doctrine that, under the rule of reason guiding the judicial
application of the Sherman Act, courts have discretion to determine only whether a re-
straint of trade constitutes an "undue limitation on competitive conditions," Standard Oil
Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 58 (1911); see Ar'Te GEN. RFP. 11; note 115 infra.
Brandeis, however, was more concerned with the welfare of small business units than with
the unfettered operation of competitive processes; this orientation influenced his own in-
terpretation of the Sherman Act. See notes 91-99, 107-14 infra and accompanying text.
87. Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911); ef.
Bauer & Cie v. O'Donnell, 229 U.S. 1 (1913) ; Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339
(1908).
88. 246 U.S. 8 (1918).
89. Id. at 25.
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stare decisis, Brandeis concurred in the Court's holding. But he clearly indi-
cated his doubts as to the wisdom of the result. A manufacturer's right to
fix resale prices was "an economic question," to be decided by reference to
"relevant facts, industrial and commercial, rather than established legal prin-
ciples." 90
Brandeis had long been an ardent supporter of resale price maintenance
and bad publicly attacked the Court's decisions in the previous price-fixing
cases.9 1 In the absence of price standardization, the small producer and re-
tailer were the ones who suffered injury,92 and unwittingly the community
fostered concentration within the manufacturing and distribution segments of
the economy. Brandeis felt that the large producer, through its dominant
power, was always able to obtain conformity to a fixed price, even without
entering into a contract. 93 If necessary, the great corporation, with its sub-
stantial volume of sales, could establish its own retail outlets and deal directly
90. Id. at 27-28. Brandeis joined the dissenters in the later cases of FTC v. Beech-Nut
Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441 (1922), and United States v. A. Schrader's Son, Inc., 252 U.S.
85 (1920), which held illegal schemes to maintain minimum resale prices.
91. Brandeis, Cutthroat Prices-The Competition That Kills, Harper's Weekly, Nov.
15, 1913, p. 10; see also A. T. MASON, BANDnS: A FzEz MAN's LiFE 424-28 (1946).
92. "The public interest clearly demands that price standardization be permitted; and
it demands it in the first place in the interest of the small man [-] the small manu-
facturer, the small producer, and the small retailer. Ultimately also of the con-
sumer... ; but primarily in the competition of the small man as against the big one."
Statement of Brandeis, Hearings Before the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign
Coinwrce on Regulation of Prices, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. 201 (1915).
93. "The denial of the right to establish standing prices results in granting a privilege
to the big concerns; a discrimination in favor of the rich and powerful as against
the small man; for the concern with large capital, as the powerful trusts, can secure
adherence to the standard price, while the small manufacturer or producer can not.
The small man needs the protection of the law; but the law becomes the instrument
by which he is destroyed. The rule laid down by the Supreme Court [in the cases
cited note 87 supra] is inconsistent with the business policy adopted by this country
and recently confirmed by the Clayton Act and in the Federal trade act-the policy
of regulating competition."
Ibid.
In other pronouncements prior to 1916, Brandeis had employed the term "regulated
competition" to denote the detection and prevention by the government of unfair methods
of competition. See note 34 supra and accompanying text. One of Brandeis' arguments in
favor of price standardization was the protection of the consumer from the bait of "loss
leading"; see Hearings Before the Committee on Regulation of Prices, supra note 92, at
205-06. Although price-cutting brinded articles to lure purchase of overpriced merchan-
dise may be deemed an unfair competitive practice, price maintenance contracts prevent a
retailer from cutting prices regardless of his economic motive. Cf. Herman, A Note on
Fair Trade, 65 YALE L.J. 23, 29 (1955) ; see also note 99 infra and accompanying text.
Brandeis believed that the elimination of competition at the retail level by price stand-
ardization would not impair competition at the manufacturing level. "Nearly every
standard-priced article is a competitive article. Competition is the automatic price regu-
lator." Hearings Before the Committee on Regulation of Prices, supra note 92, at 207;
see also id. at 212, 219; Brandeis, Cutthroat Prices-The Competition. That Kills, Harper's
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with the consumer.9 4 It was the small producer who needed the power to fix
resale prices. 95 For competitive price-cutting at the retail level not only im-
paired the value of the product in the mind of the consumer but also, because
of the shrinkage in profit margin, made the individual dealers less eager to
handle the product. As a result, the small manufacturer might find himself
driven from the market.96
Resale price maintenance, Brandeis insisted, would also preserve a multi-
plicity of small retail outlets. When price standardization was illegal, to avoid
price cutting, the manufacturer of a trade-marked article usually sold it to
only one distributor in each market area.9 7  The dealer who handled the
product was inevitably a large unit, like the department store. As a result, the
small independent retailer was gradually exterminated. With uniform resale
pricing, new spheres of merchandising would be opened up:
"The whole world can be drawn into the field. Every dealer . .. can
be made a purveyor of [an] article, and you have stimulated, through
the fixed price, the little man as against the department store, and as
against the large unit which may otherwise monopolize [retail] trade." s
Thus, in order to retain smallness and a healthy diffusion of economic power
in both manufacturing and retailing, Brandeis again advocated a partial aban-
donment of competitive principles. Dealers should no longer be free to lower
the designated prices of trade-marked goods, even if such price-cutting repre-
sented rational economic behavior in view of the demand and cost factors
confronting the individual merchant.9 9 This restriction, Brandeis felt, would
Weekly, Nov. 15, 1913, p. 11, ("No man is bound to compete with himself."); Brandeis,
On Maintaining Maker's Prices, Harper's Weekly, June 14, 1913, p. 6, reprinted in THE
CuRsE OF BIGNESS 125 (Fraenkel ed. 1934) ; cf. Adams, Resale Price Maintenance: Fact
and Fancy, 64 YALE L.J. 967, 972 (1955). Such reasoning has been criticized for its fail-
ure to recognize the connection between resale price maintenance and price stabilization
in oligopolistic industries. When each oligopolist fixes its own retail price, it cannot avoid
responsibility, and will invite inevitable reprisals, if it seeks to undercut the prevailing
market price. See STOCKING & WATKcINS, MONOPOLY AND FREE ENTERPRISE 323 n.15
(1951).
94. Hearings Before the Cdmmittee on Regulation of Prices, supra note 92, at 202,
238; Brandeis, Cutthroat Prices-The Competition That Kills, Harper's Weekly, Nov. 15,
1913, pp. 11, 12.
95. "[T]he prohibition of price-maintenance imposes upon the small and independent
producers a serious handicap. Some avenue of escape must be sought by them; and it may
be found in combination." Id. at 12.
96. Ibid.
97. Ibid.
98. See statement of Brandeis, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on the Oldfield
Revision of Patent Statutes of the House Conznittee on Patents, 62d Cong., 2d Sess., no.
18, at 3-25 (1912). The quoted passage is reprinted in THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC VIEWs
oF MR. JusTicE BRANDEIS 401 (Lief ed. 1930).
99. Cf. FTC, REPORT ON RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE lXiV (1945):
"The purpose of [the Miller-Tydings amendment to the Sherman Act] is not to
legalize contracts whose object is to prevent predatory price cutting for an ulterior
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tend to put the large and small distribution units on equal terms, and preclude
the control of retail trade by the giant concern.
Trade Associations of Small Producers
In the 1921 American Column & Lumber case, 10 the Supreme Court de-
bated the legality of a trade association's activities under section 1 of the Sher-
man Act. 365 producers of hardwood lumber, who jointly controlled thirty
per cent of the industry's output, had entered into an "Open Competition
Plan." Under this arrangement, each competitor submitted to a central clear-
ing house information on sales, prices, purchasers and stocks on hand, supple-
mented by estimates of future production and market conditions.' 0 ' The asso-
ciation then prepared a digest of this data, which it distributed to members
of the pool. Accompanying these reports was the interpretation of a skilled
market analyst, including "significant suggestions" as to both future prices
and output.'0 2 Frequent meetings were held, at which members were urged to
avoid "overproduction."
The Court found that the main purpose and result of the Plan were to
restrict output and thereby raise prices, "regardless of cost or merit."'10 3
Although no specific agreement to this effect had been consummated, the Court
felt that the disposition of members to cooperate in furtherance of common
goals, combined with the publicity incident to detailed reports on each com-
petitor's operations, were an effective guarantee of the Plan's success. The
Court was convinced by the evidence that the Plan was designed to effectuate
cooperative exploitation of the market, and not merely to facilitate an en-
lightened independent judgment by each producer.10 4  Such concerted action
purpuse. The antitrust laws do not condemn such contracts. The . . . amendment
legalizes contracts whose object is to require all dealers to sell at not less than the
resale price stipulated by contract without reference to their individual selling costs
or selling policies."
See also STOCKING & WATKINS, MONOPOLY AND FREE ENTERPRISE 322, 330 (1951). For
further discussion of the pros and cons of fair trade, see notes 121, 123 infra and accom-
panying text.
100. American Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377 (1921.).
101. Id, at 394-95. Every member of the Plan was required to make a daily report of
all sales made, including the names of buyers, the quality of the lumber sold, and the prices
charged. In addition, members made monthly reports showing production during the pre-
vious month and stock on hand.
102. Id. at 399.
103. Id. at 409.
104. "Genuine competitors do not make daily, weekly and monthly reports of the
minutest details of their business to their rivals, as the defendants did .... This is
not the conduct of competitors but ... of men united in an agreement, express or
implied, to act together and pursue a common purpose under a common guide. ...
Id. at 410.
The majority opinion summarily rejected defendants' contention that the purpose of the
Plan was merely to provide widely scattered market participants with trade data, similar
to that disseminated in newspaper and government publications. The Court observed that
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by naturally competing dealers was held "inconsistent with that free and
unrestricted trade which the statute contemplates shall be maintained."'',
The dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Brandeis reflects his concern for the
welfare of small business. Brandeis insisted that the cooperative conduct of
individual enterprises which the Court had condemned was not an illegal
restraint of trade but an effort to make "rational" competition possible. He
considered the Open Competition Plan a feasible means of supplying competi-
tors with relevant trade data not otherwise available. For hardwood lumber
mills were widely scattered, and most of them were located away from principal
markets. Unless facilities were established to disseminate information to all
producers, the firms located near the large centers would gain an advantage
over the isolated firms, and the large concern, which was able to establish its
own bureau of statistics, would enjoy a marked superiority over the small
concern. By making the facts available to every rival, the trade association
created a healthy freedom of opportunity.10 6
So much of Brandeis' views did not necessarily differ from those of the
majority. And for Brandeis the increase in market prices which was perpe-
trated through the trade association, and which was stressed by the majority,
was insufficient evidence of illegal collusion. The cooperating members of the
association had not created a monopoly or coerced trade rivals:
"It may be that the distribution of the trade data, the editorial comment
and the conferences enabled the producers to obtain, on the average,
higher prices than would otherwise have been possible. But . . . the
illegality of a combination under the Sherman Law lies not in its effect
upon the price level, but in the coercion thereby effected.' 10 7
Brandeis warned that a refusal to permit such cooperative behavior by a
multitude of small producers might eventually cause a centralization of in-
dustrial power in the hands of one giant unit. For unrestricted competition
among independent concerns might lead to such a shrinkage of profit margins
that competitors would be induced to consolidate in order to improve their
economic position. Brandeis pointed out that, under prior Court decisions,
such control of thirty per cent of an industry's output by a single corporation
published reports were available to buyer and seller alike, while the information collected
by the association was distributed only to sellers. In addition the majority opinion pointed
out that newspaper publication of market data was not analyzed by a specialist for the
common elucidation of trade rivals. Id. at 411-12.
105. Id. at 409.
106. Id. at 415-16. But cf. note 104 supra and accompanying text.
'In several pronouncements prior to his appointment to the Court, Brandeis had em-
phasized the importance of access of all competitors to relevant trade data. See statement
before Federal Trade Commission, April 30, 1915, printed in THE SoCIAL AND EcoNoMc
VIEws or MR. JUSTICE BRANDEIS 411-15 (Lief ed. 1930) ; address, The Democracy of
Business, Feb. 5, 1914, printed in THE CuRsE OF BIGNESS 137, 140-42 (Fraenkel ed. 1934).
107. American Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377, 417-18 (1921).
(Emphasis added.)
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would not per se violate the antitrust laws. 08 And the emergence of a single
huge enterprise in the hardwood lumber business would necessarily be accom-
panied by those social hazards incident to bigness.109
Joint action by independent competitors to restrict their production and
thereby raise prices would draw sharp condemnation from supporters of
classical competitive principles. Such collusive conduct would represent an
effort to maximize total profit by approximating the level of output which
would be set by a single-firm monopolist." 0 Similarly, a contemporary observer
evaluating the economic performance of the industry would conclude that con-
sumers were obtaining less goods at higher prices than would prevail in the
absence of competitive restraints."'
For Brandeis, however, these standards were not the test by which the
conduct of the industry under scrutiny should be judged. In his opinion, the
main object of the Sherman Act was not to secure optimum economic results.
Rather, the Act aimed at bigness; it was intended to prevent the existence
of the market power incident to industrial concentration."12 And, since the
108. Brandeis referred to United States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417
(1920), and United States v. United Shoe Machinery Co., 247 U.S. 32 (1918).
109. "May not these hardwood lumber concerns, frustrated in their efforts to rationalize
competition, be led to enter the inviting field of consolidation? And if they do, may
not another huge trust with highly centralized control over vast resources, natural,
manufacturing and financial, become so powerful as to dominate competitors, whole-
salers, retailers, consumers, employees and, in large measure, the community?"
American Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377, 419 (1921). Cf. note 95
supra.
Brandeis thus pointed out a dilemma in antitrust enforcement which still exists today:
that though loose-knit combinations of independent competitors are readily invalidated
under the "per se" doctrines, different standards may prevail in determining the legality
under the Sherman Act of a merger of competitors. Cf. United States v. Columbia Steel
Co., 334 U.S. 495, 521-23 (1948) ("per se" doctrine not applied to instances of vertical and
horizontal integration in the steel industry). See also the dissenting opinion of Douglas,
J., in Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 315 (1949). Justice Douglas dis-
approved the Court's invalidation of Standard Oil's exclusive supply contracts with inde-
pendent dealers, because he believed that "the elimination of these requirements contracts
sets the stage for Standard and the other oil companies to build service-station empires of
their own." Id. at 320. "The method of doing business under requirements contracts at least
kecps the independents alive. They survive as small business units.... The requirements
contract which is displaced is relatively innocuous as compared with the virulent growth of
monopoly power which the Court encourages." Id. at 319-21.
110. See STOCKINa & WATKINS, MONOPOLY AND FRE ENTRPRISE 234, 237, 255
(1951) ; cf. BAIN, PRIcE THEORY 209-10 (1952).
111. Such was the conclusion of Stocking in The Rule of Reaso, Workable Com-
petition, and the Legality of Trade Association Activities, 21 U. CHI. L. REv. 527, 544-46
(1954).
112. Cf. the dissenting opinion of Douglas, J., in United States v. Columbia Steel Co.,
334 U.S. 495, 535-36 (1948) :
"We have here the problem of bigness. Its lesson should by now have been burned
into our memory by Brandeis. The Curse of Bigness shows how size can become
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goal of the Act was diffused economic power, those restraints of trade which
section 1 condemned were coercive ones, that is, restraints intended to foster
market dominance by restricting the freedom of existing competitors or pre-
venting the entry of new ones. In terms of Brandeis' antitrust objectives, the
"Open Competition Plan" served the same purpose as resale price mainte-
ance; though restraints on competition, they both tended to preserve smallness
and were therefore legal. Any price increase which accompanied their opera-
tion was the premium society paid to avoid the curse of bigness." 3 A restric-
tion of competitive conditions, though economically harmful, had again been
deemed by Brandeis a political and social necessity."
4
a menace-both industrial and social .... In final analysis, size in steel is the
measure of the power of a handful of men over our economy, That power can be
utilized with lightning speed. It can be benign or it can be dangerous. The philosophy
of the Sherman Act is that it should not exist. For all power tends to develop into
a government in itself. Power that controls the economy should be in the hands of
elected representatives of the people, not in the hands of an industrial oligarchy.
Industrial power should be decentralized.... That is the philosophy and command
of the Sherman Act."
See also the dissenting opinion of Douglas, J., in Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337
U.S. 293, 318 (1949). For further discussion of Brandeis' views on the relation of the
antitrust laws to bigness, see ERNST, JUSTIcE BRANDEIS' FivE, POINTS 10 (Brandeis Law-
yers' Soc'y 1947).
113. In 1911 Brandeis had indicated his belief that an agreement among a multiplicity
of independent competitors regulating prices and production was less serious than the con-
trol of an industry by a single corporate unit. The association of independents "is far less
objectionable than the large aggregations, because it leaves, in respect to ... management
and production, absolute independence, and it is limited only in respect to selling price and
market.. . . [I]t particularly does not lead to those evils which are attendant upon large
aggregations. ... Interstatc Commerce Hearings 1249. Brandeis also maintained that he
conceived it "perfectly possible that a state of affairs might arise under which it might be
necessary, in order to preserve competition, to allow some kind of trade agreements." Id.
at 1250. (Emphasis added.) But he indicated he was not satisfied that any such condition
existed at that time. Ibid. See also Brandeis, The Solution of the Trust Problem, Harper's
Weekly, Nov. 8, 1913, p. 19. And cf. Brandeis' dissenting opinion in Louis K. Liggett Co.
v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 577-79 (1933) (cooperation of independently owned retail stores to
obtain advantages of size considered preferable to chains of stores owned by single cor-
porate unit).
Brandeis' assertion that trade agreements regulating prices and production were con-
sistent with the preservation of competition foreshadowed his later emphasis on the pro-
tectioL of small competitors rather than the free play of competitive economic forces.
1.14. Brandeis agreed with the opinion of the Court in the four other cases concerning
trade association activities which the Court decided while he was a member. In Maple
Flooring Manufacturers Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 563 (1925), the Court approved
an association of twenty-two lumber producers, distinguishing American Colom on the
ground that, in the instant case, the Government had not shown "any agreement or any
concerted action with respect to prices or production," id. at 586. Much of Justice Stone's
language in Maple Flooring endorsing the exchange of information on average production
costs, sales and inventories resembles Brandeis' defense of "rational" competition in his
American Column dissent. Compare American Column & Lumber Co. v. United States,




Mr. justice Brandeis' writings and opinions indicate the conflict between
competition and smallness as alternative goals of national policy. Both these
standards have influenced our present public policy toward market structures.
Promotion of competition has been generally accepted as the basic objective
of the antitrust laws. 15 But although legislation has attempted to advance
competition in the industrial sector of the economy, it has simultaneously
limited competition in other sectors. Present agricultural policy evinces a
clear lack of satisfaction with a competitive determination of farm prices and
output.110 The Miller-Tydings Act," 7 the McGuire Act,"" and the state
fair trade laws were designed to eliminate price competition in a large area
of retail distribution." 9 The Robinson-Patman Act was an effort to help
the independent businessman survive the competition of the mass distributor. 2 0
For many observers such governmental efforts to restrict the operation of
competitive forces are unwarranted deviations from the principle of free
competition on which the American economy is predicated. The fair trade
laws have been widely attacked as inconsistent with antitrust policies, since
they are considered to deprive the consumer of the benefits of price competi-
Ass'n v. United States, supra at 582-84. The Maple Flooring decision is criticized in
Stocking, supra note 111, at 546-66. In Cement Manufacturers Protective Ass'n v. United
States, 268 U.S. 588 (1925), an association of nineteen cement producers was held not
in violation of the Sherman Act; the Court found the association was formed primarily to
serve legitimate business goals and not to suppress competition among members.
Brandeis also concurred in the unanimous opinion of the Court in United States v.
American Linseed Oil Co., 262 U.S. 371 (1923), invalidating an association of twelve
manufacturers of linseed products that jointly controlled "a very large part" of the national
industry, id. at 380. Brandeis' willingness to condemn this association, despite his approval
of the two associations in the lumber industry, is explicable in terms of the large market
share which the competitors in Linseed collectively enjoyed, the relatively large size of
each individual competitor, id. at 389, and the "coercive" system of fines imposed on non-
conforming members, id. at 382, 389, cf. text at note 107 supra. Brandeis was also a mem-
ber of the Court when it unanimously dissolved an association of fifteen sugar refining
companies in Sugar Institute, Inc. v. United States, 297 U.S. 553 (1936). Here, as in
Linseed, the members of the association were themselves relatively large business units,
and together supplied 70-80% of the national consumption of sugar. Id. at 571-72.
115. ATr'y GEN. REP. 1; see, e.g., United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S.
150, 218, 221-22 (1940) ; Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 337-38
(1904) ; United States v. Joint-Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505, 569 (1898).
116. See EDw. =s, MAINTAINING COMPEtITION 62-66 (1949); STOCKING & WATKINS,
MONOPOLY AND FaEE ENTERPRISE 392-400, 537 (1951); Benedict, Attempts to Restrict
Competition in Agriculture: The Government Programs, 44 AM. ECON. I.Ev. 93 (Supp.
1954).
117. 50 STAT. 693 (1937), 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1952), amending 26 STAT. 209 (1890).
118. 66 STAT. 631, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1952), amending 38 STAT. 719 (1914).
119. FTC, REPORT ON RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE passim (1945).
120. H.R. REP. No. 2287, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936) ; S. REP. No. 1502, 74th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1936) ; cf. FTC, Final Report on the Chain-Store Investigation, S. Doc No. 4,
74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1934).
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tion in retailing.' 2 ' Similarly, commentators have objected to the anti-competi-
tive focus of the Robinson-Patman Act; they contend that enforcement of
this statute has denied the public price advantages flowing from the free opera-
tion of competitive forces in distribution. 122
Such criticism of competitive restrictions may be sound from the point of
view of consumer welfare. But the fact is that the legislation under attack is
a boon to small business. 12 3 And the message of Mr. Justice Brandeis is that
economic performance standing alone provides an inadequate standard for
judging the effects of such competitive restraints. Not to be overlooked are
the social and political advantages which may accompany the preservation of
the small businessman and the diffusion of concentrated economic power.
There are strong arguments that freedom of opportunity vanishes and indi-
vidual initiative deteriorates "when a nation of shopkeepers is transformed
121, Awry GENt. REP. 149-54 (Fair trade "is at odds with the most elementary prin-
ciples of a dynamic free enterprise system.") ; EDWARDS, MAINTAINING COMPETITION 66-
73 (1949) ("There is no more reason to protect distributors from price competition than
to protect manufacturers."); FTC, REPORT ON RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE lix-Lxiv
(1945) ("[Tlhe consumer is ... entitled ... to competition between dealers handling the
same branded product.") ; STOCKING & WATKINS, MONOPOLY AND FREE ENTERPRISE 321-
30, 561 (1951) ("From the standpoint of the public interest in revitalizing competitive
forces, resale price maintenance is objectionable whatever group sponsors it.") ; Hcarings
Before the Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monwpoly of the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary on a Study of the Antitrust Laws, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 15-20, 67-69, 255,
273 ; pt. 2, at 578, 616, 624 (1955).
122. Ar'y GEN. RaP. 164-65, 171-72, 177, 190, 207-08; EDWARDS, MAINTAINING
COMPETITION 166-69 (1949) ; UNITED STATES DEP'T OF COMMERCE, EFFECTIVE COmPEITioN
1, 5, 7 (1952) (Robinson-Patman "is a legal barbed wire entanglement that discourages
competition in favor of protecting competitors.") ; STOCKING & WATKINS, MONOPOLY AND
FREE ENTERPRISE 538-39, 561 (1951); Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Antitrust
and Mkonopoly, supra note 121, pt. 1, at 81-82, 201, 256, 272-73, 397-98; pt. 2, at 616-18, 624;
Rowe, supra note 62, at 972-75; Learned & Isaacs, The Robinson-Patian Law: Some
Assumptions and Expectations, 15 HARv. Bus. REv. 137, 139 (1937) ("an anti-competition
statute slipped into the anti-trust laws") ; Burns, The Anti-trust Laws and the Regulation
of Price Competition, 4 LAW & CoN=a,. PROB. 301, 308-09 (1937) ; cf. Standard Oil Co.
v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231, 249 & n.15 (1951).
123. "Robinson-Patman helps keep small businessmen in business by relieving them
of some of the worst risks of competition, and this may be bad economics but it is arguably
good policy." Rahl, Antitrust Policy in Distribution, 104 U. PA. L. REv. 185, 192 (1955).
See also statement of President Truman when signing the McGuire Act, 1 CCH TRME
REG. REP. (10th ed.) ff 3040.10 (July 14, 1952) ; dissenting views in ATf'y GEN. REP.
154-55, 220; Mermey, Fair Trade: The Fundamental Issues, 1 AnTRUSr BULL. 125, 143-
45 (1955) ; Schwartz, The Schwartz Dissent, 1 id. at 37, 59; Galbraith, Countervailing
Power, 44 Am. Ecost. Ray. 1, 3 (Supp. 1954) ; H.R. REP. No. 1610, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 84
(1954) ; remarks of representatives of small business in Hearings Before the Senate Select
Committee on Small Business to Consider the Report of the Attorney General's National
Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 101, 105, 111, 180, 182, 325
(1955) (The Robinson-Patman Act and federal fair trade laws "are the only two statutes




into a nation of clerks,' 24 that control of distribution by a handful of large
companies is less desirable in a democracy than a multiplicity of independ-
ents.12; Although these noneconomic contentions have escaped the attention
of many commentators, they may justify the paradoxes of present public
policy.
Moreover, the social and political objections to the giant corporate unit
which Brandeis stressed are likely to become of increasing importance in the
adjudication of future antitrust prosecutions. For example, a representative
of the Justice Department has recently suggested that the growing dominance
of the nation's automotive industry by General Motors might make it a proper
target for an antitrust suit. 20 If the government does seek divestiture of parts
of General Motors, 2 7 such action would not seem motivated by dissatisfaction
with G.M.'s present economic performance. 28
However, though the concentration of force in the auto industry may lead
to efficiency and progress, it also shatters the effectiveness of traditional eco-
nomic restraints on market power.129 As a result, the consumer who enjoys
124. DOUGLAS, DEMOCRACY AND FINANCE 15 (1940) ; see also FROMM, EscAPE. FROM
FrnEmDOM 123-28 (1941); KAPLAN, SMALL BUSINESS: ITS PLACE AND PROBLEMS 1, 3-4
(1948) ; note 64 supra.
125. See QUINN, GIANT BusINEss: THREAT TO DEMOCRACY (1953) ; Schwartz, supra
note 123, at 38-40; E. S. Mason, The New Competition, 43 YaLE REV. 37, 42, 48 (1.953);
notes 11, 112 supra.
126. Remarks of Stanley N. Barnes, Assistant Attorney General of the United States
in charge of the Antitrust Division, reported in Time, Mar. 19, 1956, p. 105; see also ad-
dress by Barnes, How Business Mlergers Affect the Economic Outlook of the United
Stales, Feb. 8, 1956, pp. 10-11, 14, N.Y. Times, Feb. 9, 1.956, p. 1, col. 8; statement by
Barnes, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly, supra note 121,
pt. 1, at 295-98.
127. The government has recently filed a civil antitrust complaint charging General
Motors with monopolizing the manufacture and sale of transit and intercity buses, and with
conspiring with four bus operating companies to monopolize the manufacture and sale of
buses. The complaint alleges that General Motors manufactured 85% of the new buses
sold in the United States in 1955. The government asks, inter alia, that General Motors
be enjoined from selling more than 50% of the annual bus requirements of the four operat-
ing companies named as co-conspirators. United States v. General Motors Corp., Civil
No. 15816, E.D. Mich., complaint filed, 1 CCH TRADE REG. REP. II 66248 (July 6, 1956).
128. General Motors is generally reputed to be a well-managed and efficiently run
corporation. For a picture of the company's internal workings, see DRUCKER, THE CoN-
CEIT OF THE CORPORATION (1946) ; Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Antitrust and
M1fonopoly, supra note 121, pt. 7, at 3492-844; pt. 8. Although the Staff Report of the
Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly, Bigness and Concentration of Economic Power
-. A Case Study of General Motors Corp., S. REP. No. -, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-5, 12-13,
24-25, 59 (1956), suggests that checking the expansion, and divesting parts, of G.M.'s
diversified organization would foster the social values of a free enterprise system, the
Report does not challenge the economic efficiency of the company in the conduct of prior
business operations.
129. "I should not rely upon the goodness of heart of anybody. Neither our character
nor our intelligence can long bear the strain of unrestricted power." Remark of Brandeis,
May, 1905, quoted in A. T. MAsoN, THE BRANDEIS WAY 71 (1938).
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reasonable prices and maximum production today is denied guarantees such
performance will continue. Moreover, such industrial concentration means that
a few business leaders are permitted and required to make decisions which
affect a considerable segment of our society.130 The exercise of such far-
reaching powers by a politically nonresponsible group would, to Louis Bran-
deis, be incompatible with the democratic tenet that governing power should
be entrusted to elected representatives of the governed.
130. "There is probably no company in the United States that affects the lives of the
citizens of the country as much as General Motors." Staff Report of Subcommittee on
Antitrust and Monopoly, supra note 128, at 25. General Motors, the largest manufactur-
ing company in the world, id. at 2, employs over half a million persons, ibid., and enjoyed
gross sales of $12.4 billion in 1955, id. at 25.
See also BERLE, THE 20TH CENTURY CAPITALIST REVOLUTION C. II (1954).
